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ABSTRACT
Pervasive computing environments have created a require-
ment for spatial- and temporal-aware access control systems.
Although temporal, spatial and spatio-temporal role-based
access control (RBAC) models have been developed, a fam-
ily of simple, expressive and °exible models that convinc-
ingly addresses the interaction between spatio-temporal con-
straints and inheritance in RBAC does not yet exist. In
this paper, we de¯ne three spatio-temporal models based on
RBAC96 the de facto standard for RBAC, and extend these
models to include activation and usage hierarchies. These
models provide di®erent authorization semantics, varying in
the extent to which RBAC entities and relations are con-
strained by spatio-temporal restrictions. We introduce the
notion of trusted entities, which are used to selectively over-
ride certain spatio-temporal restrictions. We also demon-
strate that our spatio-temporal models are consistent and
compatible with RBAC96 and the ANSI-RBAC standard,
in contrast to existing models. Finally, we propose four ap-
proaches to encoding spatio-temporal requirements in prac-
tical applications that permit access requests to be answered
e±ciently.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
D.4.6 [Security and Protection]: Access controls; K.6.5
[Management of Computing and Information Sys-
tems]: Security and Protection
General Terms
Security, Theory
Keywords
ERBAC, RBAC, Spatio-temporal domain
1. INTRODUCTION
Role-based access control (RBAC) has been the subject
of considerable research in the last decade [1, 10, 14] and is
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widely accepted as an alternative to traditional discretionary
and mandatory access controls. The emergence of mobile
and ubiquitous computing environments poses new demands
on access control mechanisms, because the decision to grant
access may depend on contextual information, such as the
location of the user and the time at which access requests
are made. It may be appropriate, for example, to limit the
time and places at which a particular role can be activated.
Several context-based RBAC models have been de¯ned in
recent years [3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 12, 15]. Each of these models
introduces extensions to the basic role-based model in which
components may be associated with general contextual con-
straints [6, 7, 15], temporal constraints [3, 9], spatial con-
straints [4, 8], or spatio-temporal constraints [12]. However,
none of these models accurately captures the interaction be-
tween spatio-temporal constraints and inheritance in RBAC
model: indeed, all of them have one or more of the following
limitations.
² No existing model has clear semantics for inheritance
in the role hierarchy in the presence of spatio-temporal
constraints. This means that there is no way of design-
ing an algorithm for deciding access requests.
² Existing models are extremely complicated. GTR-
BAC [9] and the spatio-temporal RBAC model of
Ray and Toahchoodee [12] de¯ne a large number of
predicates to specify temporal constraints and spatio-
temporal constraints, respectively. The relationship
between these predicates is often unclear, again mak-
ing it di±cult to see how access requests should be
evaluated in such models.
² Con°icts and ambiguity may occur in existing models.
Con°icts may arise among the constraints speci¯cation
in spatio-temporal RBAC [12], for example.
² Existing models lack compatibility with RBAC96 and
the closely related ANSI-RBAC standard. It is not at
all clear how to translate the predicates used in GTR-
BAC [9] and spatio-temporal RBAC [12], for example,
to the entities and relations used in the ANSI-RBAC
standard and RBAC96.
In summary, we would argue that existing models focus far
too much on syntax, and far too little on semantics.
In this paper, we undertake a rigorous analysis of spatio-
temporal requirements in RBAC models. We use a graph-
based formalism to de¯ne the semantics of RBAC96 [14] and
ERBAC07 [5]; this formalism provides the basis for the se-
mantics of our subsequent models. We then de¯ne three
205di®erent spatio-temporal RBAC models, motivating the de-
velopment of these models using simple scenarios. These
models extend the basic RBAC96 model with very little ad-
ditional syntax. We also introduce the idea of trusted en-
tities: for such entities spatio-temporal constraints may be
ignored, in order to deal with certain scenarios. These sim-
ple, expressive, °exible spatio-temporal RBAC models have
clear, well-de¯ned semantics and are designed to be compat-
ible with RBAC96 and the ANSI-RBAC standard.
In an e®ort to address interoperability problems that ex-
ist when there is a single role hierarchy and separation duty
constraints, ERBAC96 [13] and ERBAC07 [5] have been de-
¯ned to separate the role activation hierarchy and the per-
mission usage hierarchy. We extend our models to include
spatio-temporal requirements for ERBAC07.
The existence of spatio-temporal constraints will gener-
ally result in a more complex access control decision func-
tion. Hence, we consider the implementation of our spatio-
temporal RBAC models in practical applications. We ¯nd
that it is possible to use one of our models to encode most
spatio-temporal requirements, if we assume that there is no
role hierarchy. On the other hand, if a role hierarchy is
required, we show how to eliminate spatio-temporal con-
straints on roles by imposing restrictions on outer nodes
and edges, such as users and user-role assignments. In ad-
dition, we demonstrate how to improve the e±ciency of ac-
cess request checking by pre-computing spatio-temporal con-
straints over the transitive closure of (part of) the RBAC
graph. We believe that our models can be e±ciently and
easily implemented, in contrast to existing models.
All existing models tend to focus on the syntax of tem-
poral and spatial constraints, rather than on the seman-
tics of the model. While we believe that the syntax of
such constraints will generally be application-dependent,
we do consider the representation of spatio-temporal con-
straints, distinguishing between concrete and symbolic do-
mains. Concrete domains comprise a set of points de¯ned
by some numerically-encoded reference system; symbolic do-
mains comprise sets of labels, each corresponding to one or
more points in a concrete domain. Our approach is consid-
erably simpler and more general than existing work, such as
GTRBAC [9].
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the
next section, we recall the basic features of RBAC96 and
ERBAC07. We also introduce a novel graph-based formal-
ism to de¯ne the semantics of RBAC96 and ERBAC07. In
Section 3, we formally de¯ne the RBAC
=
ST, RBAC
+
ST and
RBAC
¡
ST models, and introduce the notion of trusted enti-
ties. We also demonstrate the use of RBAC96-style syntax
to encode spatio-temporal RBAC models, and illustrate how
to integrate our spatio-temporal functions into the ANSI-
RBAC standard. In Section 4, we introduce the ERBAC
=
ST,
ERBAC
+
ST and ERBAC
¡
ST models for ERBAC07. In Sec-
tion 5, we consider the practical considerations in spatio-
temporal RBAC models., focusing on the interaction be-
tween spatio-temporal constraints and the role hierarchy.
In Section 6, we discuss possible representations of spa-
tial and temporal domains, and give concrete examples of
spatial RBAC
=
ST, temporal RBAC
=
ST and spatio-temporal
ERBAC
=
ST. Section 7 compares our work with related work
in the literature. Section 8 concludes the paper with some
suggestions for future work.
2. PRELIMINARIES
2.1 RBAC96 syntax
The RBAC96 family of models is undoubtedly the most
well known model for RBAC [14], and provides the basis for
the recent ANSI RBAC standard [1]. RBAC0, the simplest
RBAC96 model, introduces a set of users U, a set of ses-
sions S, a set of roles R, a set of permissions P,
1 a user-role
assignment relation UA µ U £ R and a permission-role as-
signment relation PA µ P £R. A user u may activate a role
r in a session s if there exists r 2 R such that (u;r) 2 UA.
A user u is authorized for permission p if there exists r 2 R
such that u may activate r and (p;r) 2 PA.
RBAC1 introduces the concept of role hierarchy, which is
modeled as a partial order on the set of roles (R;6). The role
hierarchy (RH µ R£R) is used to reduce the administrative
burden by reducing the number of explicit assignments in
UA and PA relations. That is, a user u may activate a role
r in session s if there exists r
0 2 R such that (u;r
0) 2 UA
and r 6 r
0. A user u is authorized for permission p if there
exists r;r
0 2 R such that u may activate r
0, (p;r) 2 PA and
r 6 r
0.
RBAC2 extends RBAC0 through the addition of access
control constraints, such as separation of duty constraints,
cardinality constraints etc. RBAC3 incorporates the fea-
tures of RBAC1 and RBAC2, although it has long been
known that the features of those two models are somewhat
incompatible. From now on, we write RBAC96 to mean
RBAC1 only; note that RBAC0 is a special case of RBAC1
in which the hierarchy relation is empty.
2.2 RBAC96 semantics
We introduce a novel graph-based formulation of
RBAC96, which we believe to be simple and intuitive spec-
i¯cation of basic components of RBAC96 model. As we
will see, this formulation can be readily extended to include
spatio-temporal restrictions. We construct an acyclic, di-
rected graph G = (V;E), where V = U [ R [ P, and
E = UA [ PA [ RH. In other words, each vertex v rep-
resents an entity, such as a user u, a role r or a permission p
in a RBAC96 system, and each directed edge e = (vi;vj)
represents a relationship between two entities vi and vj;
speci¯cally, (vi;vj) 2 E if and only if (precisely) one of the
following conditions holds
(vi;vj) 2 UA;
(vj;vi) 2 RH;
(vj;vi) 2 PA:
An authorization path (or au-path) between v1 and vn is
a sequence of vertices v1;:::;vn such that (vi;vi+1) 2 E,
i = 1;:::;n ¡ 1. Hence, a user u can activate a role r if
there is an au-path between u and r; a role r is authorized
for permission p if there is an au-path between r and p; and
a user u is authorized for permission p is there is an au-path
between u and p. For simplicity, we introduce the following
de¯nition.
Definition 1. An entity v 2 U [ R is RBAC96-
authorized for v
0 2 R [ P if and only if there exists an
1The nature of a permission depends largely on the imple-
mentation details of a system, and some authors prefer to
treat permissions as \uninterpreted symbols" [14].
206au-path v = v1;v2;:::;vn = v
0.
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2.3 ERBAC07 syntax
It has been observed that there are a number of situations
where it is necessary to distinguish between role activation
and permission usage [13]. In particular, it solves certain
issues that arise when there is a role hierarchy and sepa-
ration of duty constraints (as in RBAC3). The ERBAC96
(extended RBAC96) model introduces a separate role activa-
tion hierarchy, a relation which is a superset of the (permis-
sion) usage hierarchy [13]. This means that it is necessary
for a user to explicitly activate certain roles in order to ob-
tain authorization for the permissions associated with those
roles.
Chen and Crampton recently introduced ERBAC07 [5],
which de¯nes the activation and usage hierarchies by replac-
ing the standard role hierarchy relation with a new relation
RH = R£R£fa;ug. The activation hierarchy is denoted by
RH a = f(r;r
0) : (r;r
0;a) 2 RHg, and the permission usage
hierarchy is denoted by RH u = f(r;r
0) : (r;r
0;u) 2 RHg.
We write 6a to denote the re°exive transitive closure of
RH a and 6u to denote the re°exive transitive closure of
RH u. In other words, the usage and activation hierarchies
are modeled as two partial orderings on the set of roles R.
ERBAC07 does not require that RH u µ RH a; otherwise it
is semantically equivalent to ERBAC96.
2.4 ERBAC07 semantics
We construct an acyclic, directed graph G = (V;E), where
V = U [ R [ P, and E = UA [ PA [ RH a [ RH u. An
activation path (or a-path) between v1 and vn is de¯ned to
be a sequence of vertices v1;:::;vn such that (v1;v2) 2 UA
and (vi+1;vi) 2 RH a for i = 2;:::;n ¡ 1. A usage path (or
u-path) between v1 and vn is de¯ned to a sequence of vertices
v1;:::;vn such that (vi+1;vi) 2 RH u (i = 1;:::;n ¡ 2) and
(vn;vn¡1) 2 PA. In ERBAC07:
² v 2 U may activate role v
0 2 R if and only if there
exists an a-path v = v1;v2;:::;vn = v
0;
² v 2 R is authorized for permission v
0 2 P if and only
if there exists a u-path v = v1;v2;:::;vn = v
0;
² v 2 U is authorized for permission v
0 2 P if and only if
there exists a path v = v1;v2;:::;vi;:::;vn = v
0 such
that vi 2 R for some i, v1;:::;vi is an a-path, and
vi;:::;vn is a u-path.
We say v1;:::;vn is an au-path in ERBAC07 if v1;:::;vn
is either an a-path, or a u-path, or the concatenation of an
a-path and an u-path.
Definition 2. An entity v 2 U [ R is ERBAC07-
authorized for v
0 2 R [ P if and only if there exists an
au-path v = v1;:::;vn = v
0.
3. SPATIO-TEMPORAL RBAC
We assume the existence of the usual RBAC96 entities: U,
R, P, UA, PA, and RH; we write V to denote U [R[P and
E to denote UA [ PA [ RH. We also assume the existence
of a spatio-temporal domain D: d 2 D represents a point
2Note that r 2 R is RBAC96-authorized for r
0 2 R means
that r is senior to r
0 in the role hierarchy.
in space-time; D µ D represents a collection of points in
space-time.
3
3.1 The standard model
The standard spatio-temporal RBAC model (or RBAC
=
ST)
augments the standard RBAC96 model with a function ¸ :
V ! 2
D. For v 2 V , ¸(v) µ D denotes the set of points in
space-time at which v is \enabled". In particular,
² if u 2 U, then ¸(u) denotes the set of points in space-
time at which u may create a session;
² if r 2 R, then ¸(r) denotes the set of points in space-
time at which a role may be activated in a session;
² if p 2 P, then ¸(p) denotes the set of points in space-
time at which a permission may be granted.
Given a path v1;:::;vn in the labeled graph G = (V;E;¸),
we write b ¸(v1;:::;vn) µ D to denote
Tn
i=1 ¸(vi). In other
words, b ¸(v1;:::;vn) is the set of points at which every ver-
tex vi is enabled. When the context is clear, we will write
b ¸(v1;vn) for b ¸(v1;:::;vn).
Definition 3. An entity v 2 U [ R is RBAC
=
ST-
authorized for v
0 2 R[P at point d 2 D if and only if there
exists an au-path v = v1;v2;:::;vn = v
0 and d 2 b ¸(v;v
0).
The above de¯nition naturally imposes the following con-
straint on ¸ in the RBAC
=
ST model.
Constraint 4. If e = (v;v
0) 2 E, then ¸(v)\¸(v
0) 6= ;.
We now introduce a running example, which will be used
to motivate the additional models that we de¯ne. Figure 1
illustrates six directed graphs for di®erent user-role assign-
ments and role hierarchies: vertices u and v represent users,
and vertices r, r
0 and r
00 represent roles.
Let us assume that we want to express the following
spatio-temporal constraints:
² any user assigned explicitly to role r can only activate
this role in spatio-temporal domain D µ D;
² any user assigned explicitly to role r
0 can activate role
r from any point d 2 D;
² any user may activate role r
00 from any point d 2 D.
For concreteness, r might be a clerical role and users oc-
cupying this role may only activate this role if they are in
some particular part of the o±ce building. In contrast, r
0
is a managerial role and a user occupying this role may ac-
tivate the clerical role when she is sitting in her own o±ce
(or anywhere else); r
00 is a general employee role and can be
activated from anywhere in the o±ce.
It is obvious that we can specify these requirements us-
ing RBAC
=
ST for the con¯gurations shown in Figures 1(a)
and 1(b). In particular, for Figure 1(a), we could de¯ne
¸(u) = D or ¸(r) = D or ¸(u) = ¸(r) = D. However, for
Figure 1(b), we must de¯ne ¸(u) = D, as user v, assigned
to role r
0, is allowed to activate role r at any d 2 D.
3In Section 6 we elaborate on possible representations of
D. For the purposes of the discussion in this section, it is
su±cient to assume the existence of some abstract spatio-
temporal domain.
207Now consider the con¯guration in Figure 1(c), in which u
is also assigned to role r
00. Since u is allowed to activate r
00
at any d 2 D, we can not de¯ne ¸(u) = D; nor can we set
¸(r) = D, as v is allowed to activate r at any d 2 D. Hence,
we require a spatio-temporal constraint on edge (u;r). In
other words, RBAC
=
ST is not su±ciently expressive for cer-
tain RBAC96 con¯gurations and spatio-temporal require-
ments. For this reason, we now introduce a second model.
3.2 The strong model
The strong spatio-temporal RBAC model (RBAC
+
ST) aug-
ments the RBAC
=
ST model with a function ¹ : E ! 2
D. For
e = (v;v
0) 2 E, ¹(v;v
0) denotes the set of points in space-
time at which the association between v and v
0 is enabled.
In particular,
² if (u;r) 2 UA, ¹(u;r) denotes the set of points in
space-time at which u is assigned to r;
² if (r;r
0) 2 RH, ¹(r
0;r) denotes the set of points in
space-time at which r
0 is senior to r;
² if (p;r) 2 PA, ¹(r;p) denotes the set of points in space-
time at which p is assigned to r.
Given a path v1;:::;vn in the labeled graph
G = (V;E;¸;¹), we write b ¹(v1;:::;vn) to denote Tn¡1
i=1 ¹(vi;vi+1). Note that the semantics of RBAC
=
ST
imply that an edge can only be enabled if both end points
are enabled. Hence, b ¹(v;:::;v
0) is the set of points at which
every node and every edge in the path is enabled. When
the context is clear, we will write b ¹(v1;vn) for b ¹(v1;:::;vn).
We de¯ne the following constraint on ¹.
Constraint 5. If (v;v
0) 2 E, then ; ½ ¹(v;v
0) µ ¸(v)\
¸(v
0).
Definition 6. An entity v 2 U [ R is RBAC
+
ST-
authorized for v
0 2 R [ P at point d if and only if there
exists an au-path v = v1;v2;:::;vn = v
0 and d 2 b ¹(v;v
0).
Note that RBAC
=
ST is a special case of RBAC
+
ST in which
¹(v;v
0) = ¸(v) \ ¸(v
0). In other words, we can express
RBAC
=
ST using RBAC
+
ST.
Consider Figures 1(c) and 1(d). We can de¯ne ¹(u;r) = D
to express our spatio-temporal requirements in RBAC
+
ST.
However, RBAC
+
ST and RBAC
=
ST cannot be used to ex-
press these requirements given the con¯guration in Fig-
ure 1(e). In particular, we cannot de¯ne ¸(r) = D in
RBAC
=
ST or ¹(u;r) = D in RBAC
+
ST because this will only
allow u to activate r
00 at points d 2 D. We now introduce a
third model with weaker restrictions on valid authorization
paths.
3.3 The weak model
Like RBAC
=
ST, the weak spatio-temporal RBAC model (or
RBAC
¡
ST) augments the standard RBAC96 model with a
function ¸ : V ! 2
D. In RBAC
¡
ST, the authorization se-
mantics are di®erent from those in RBAC
=
ST.
Definition 7. An entity v 2 U [ R is RBAC
¡
ST-
authorized for v
0 2 R[P at point d if and only if there exists
an au-path v = v1;v2;:::;vn = v
0 and d 2 ¸(v) \ ¸(v
0).
In other words, an entity v is RBAC
¡
ST-authorized for an-
other entity v
0 if v is RBAC96-authorized for v
0, and both
entities v and v
0 are enabled. There is no requirement that
intermediate nodes on the path are enabled. These seman-
tics appear to be closest to those de¯ned in GTRBAC and
the model of Ray and Toahchoodee. However, we would ar-
gue that RBAC
¡
ST has the least intuitive semantics: why is
it appropriate to ignore the enabling conditions on interme-
diate roles? There may be occasions when it is convenient
to do so, as in Figure 1(e), but ignoring the intermediate
roles is unlikely to be appropriate in many situations, and is
inconsistent with the usual interpretation of inheritance in a
role hierarchy. We would argue that the standard or strong
models, in which enabling conditions are inherited up the
hierarchy, are more closely aligned with standard RBAC se-
mantics.
Consider Figure 1(e). Using the weak model, we can de-
¯ne ¸(r) = D to express our spatio-temporal requirements.
However, we cannot express our spatio-temporal require-
ments for the con¯guration shown in Figure 1(f) using any
of the models we have de¯ned. If we use RBAC
¡
ST, then we
require that ¸(r) = D in order to restrict u's activation of
r. This, in turn means that v is unable to activate r from
any point d 62 D. However, if we use RBAC
=
ST or RBAC
+
ST,
we must de¯ne ¸(u) = D or ¹(u;r) = D, which means that
u is unable to activate r
00 from any point d 62 D.
3.4 Trusted entities
We introduce the idea of trusted entities, which may be a
user or a role; we write T µ U[R to denote the set of trusted
entities. For an entity t 2 T, the enabling constraints on
nodes/edges in the authorization path from t are ignored.
4
Definition 8. An entity v 2 U [ R is RBAC
=
ST-
authorized for v
0 2 R [ P at point d 2 D if and only if
there exists an au-path v = v1;:::;vj;:::;vn = v
0 such
that vj 2 T and d 2 b ¸(v;vj), or there exists an au-path
v = v1;v2;:::;vn = v
0 and d 2 b ¸(v;v
0).
Definition 9. An entity v 2 U [ R is RBAC
+
ST-
authorized for v
0 2 R [ P at point d if and only if there
exists an au-path v = v1;:::;vj;:::;vn = v
0 such that
vj 2 T and d 2 b ¹(v;vj), or there exists an au¡path
v = v1;v2;:::;vn = v
0 and d 2 b ¹(v;v
0).
Definition 10. An entity v 2 U [ R is RBAC
¡
ST-
authorized for v
0 2 R [ P at point d 2 D if and only if
there exists an au-path v = v1;:::;vj;:::;vn = v
0 such that
vj 2 T and d 2 ¸(v) \ ¸(vj), or there exists an au-path
v = v1;v2;:::;vn = v
0 and d 2 ¸(v) \ ¸(v
0).
Consider Figure 1(f). In order to express our spatio-
temporal requirements, we use RBAC
¡
ST and de¯ne r
0 (or
v) to be a trusted entity and ¸(r) = D. Clearly, user v can
activate roles r and r
00 from any point because there exists
a au-path v;r
0;r (and the fact that ¸(r) = D is ignored).
4The interpretation of a privileged entity is similar to that of
a privileged method in the Java runtime environment (JRE).
The stackwalking algorithm, which is used to perform access
control in the JRE, normally examines the permissions of
every method on the stack. Access is only granted if every
method on the stack has the requested permission. How-
ever, the stackwalk terminates prematurely if a privileged
method is encountered on the stack (thereby ignoring any
methods lower down the stack that may not have the re-
quested permission).
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Figure 1: Con¯gurations of RBAC96 model
3.5 A note on RBAC96-style syntax
We currently use the functions ¸ and ¹ to de¯ne the
syntax of our spatio-temporal RBAC models, and a graph-
based formalism to de¯ne the semantics of these models. In
this section, we brie°y note that we can use RBAC96-style
syntax to encode RBAC
+
ST. (It follows that RBAC
¡
ST and
RBAC
=
ST syntax can also be adjusted in the same way.)
The familiar sets and relations from the RBAC96 model
{ U, R, P, UA, RH and PA { are adjusted to include an
extra entry, corresponding to the set of points for which the
entity or entity relationship is enabled. The set of users U,
for example, is replaced by UST µ U £ 2
D; (u;D) 2 UST
means that u is enabled for all points d 2 D. The set of user-
role assignments UA, for example, is replaced by UAST µ
U £R£2
D; (u;r;D) 2 UAST means that the assignment of
user u to role r is enabled for all points d 2 D. In RBAC
=
ST,
for example, a user u may activate a role r at point d if there
exist roles r
0 = r1;r2;:::;rn = r, such that (ri+1;ri) 2 RH,
(u;r
0) 2 UA, (u;Du) 2 UST, (ri;Di) 2 RST, i = 1;:::;n,
and d 2 Du \ D1 \ ¢¢¢ \ Dn.
3.6 Integration with ANSI-RBAC
The core and hierarchical components of ANSI-RBAC
standard are de¯ned by a set of basic element sets U, S,
R and P, a set of relations UA, RH and PA, and a set of
mapping functions, shown in the top part of Table 1.
The table demonstrates that it is easy to re-de¯ne the
ANSI-RBAC functions in the context of RBAC
=
ST and
RBAC
+
ST.
5 The function session users, also de¯ned by the
ANSI-RBAC standard, returns the user associated with a
session, and is the same for all three models. Each function,
when de¯ned for RBAC
=
ST and RBAC
+
ST, includes a param-
5For brevity, we omit RBAC
¡
ST and trusted entities from
this discussion.
eter d 2 D. For simplicity we use our original syntax, rather
than the RBAC96-style syntax.
The ANSI-RBAC standard de¯nes functions
avail session perms and session roles, shown in the
¯rst section of Table 1. These function only apply to
the core component; no analogous function is de¯ned for
the hierarchical component, which is a curious omission.
Instead, the standard de¯nes two additional functions {
authorized users and authorized permissions, each of
which take a role as a parameter.
We propose new de¯nitions for the functions session roles
and avail session perms for the hierarchical component.
These are shown in the second section of Table 1.
Note that in core RBAC, assigned permissions(r) =
authorized permissions(r) for all r. Hence, this de¯nition
is consistent with that given in the ANSI-RBAC standard.
4. SPATIO-TEMPORAL ERBAC
In this section we extend the spatio-temporal model we
have developed for RBAC96 to include the features de¯ned
in ERBAC07.
4.1 The standard model
The standard spatio-temporal ERBAC model (or
ERBAC
=
ST) combines the features of RBAC
=
ST and
ERBAC07. In other words, we extend the directed labeled
graph (V;E;¸), where E = UA [ RH a [ RH u [ PA.
Definition 11. In ERBAC
=
ST:
² a user v 2 U may activate role v
0 2 R at point d 2 D if
and only if there exists an a-path v = v1;v2;:::;vn =
v
0 and d 2 b ¸(v;v
0);
² a role v 2 R is authorized for permission v
0 2 P at
209ANSI-RBAC
assigned users(r) = fu 2 U : (u;r) 2 UAg
assigned permissions(r) = fp 2 P : (p;r) 2 PAg
session users(s) = u
session roles(s) µ fr 2 R : (session users(s);r) 2 UAg
authorized users(r) = fu 2 U : r 6 r
0;(u;r
0) 2 UAg
authorized permissions(r) = fp 2 P : r > r
0;(p;r
0) 2 PAg
avail session perms(s) =
S
r2session roles(s) assigned permissions(r)
Proposed extensions for hierarchical ANSI-RBAC
session roles(s) µ fr 2 R : r 6 r
0;(session users(s);r
0) 2 UAg
avail session perms(s) =
S
r2session roles(s) authorized permissions(r)
RBAC
=
ST
assigned users(r;d) = fu 2 U : (u;r) 2 UA; d 2 ¸(u) \ ¸(r)g
assigned permissions(r;d) = fp 2 P : (p;r) 2 PA; d 2 ¸(p) \ ¸(r)g
session roles(s;d) µ fr 2 R : r 6 r
0;(session users(s);r
0) 2 UA; d 2 b ¸(r
0;r)g
authorized users(r;d) = fu 2 U : r 6 r
0;(u;r
0) 2 UA; d 2 ¸(u) \ b ¸(r
0;r)g
authorized permissions(r;d) = fp 2 P : r > r
0;(p;r
0) 2 PA; d 2 ¸(p) \ b ¸(r;r
0)g
avail session perms(s;d) =
S
r2session roles(s;d) authorized permissions(r;d)
RBAC
+
ST
assigned users(r;d) = fu 2 U : (u;r) 2 UA; d 2 ¹(u;r)g
assigned permissions(r;d) = fp 2 P : (p;r) 2 PA; d 2 ¹(p;r)g
session roles(s;d) µ fr 2 R : r 6 r
0;(session users(s);r
0) 2 UA; d 2 b ¹(session users(s);r)g
authorized users(r;d) = fu 2 U : r 6 r
0;(u;r
0) 2 UA; d 2 b ¹(u;r)g
authorized permissions(r;d) = fp 2 P : r > r
0;(p;r
0) 2 PA; d 2 b ¹(r;p)g
avail session perms(s;d) =
S
r2session roles(s;d) authorized permissions(r;d)
Table 1: ANSI-RBAC mapping functions
point d 2 D if and only if there exists a u-path v =
v1;v2;:::;vn = v
0 and d 2 b ¸(v;v
0);
² a user v 2 U is authorized for permission v
0 2 P at
point d 2 D if and only if there exists a path v =
v1;v2;:::;vi;:::;vn = v
0 such that vi 2 R for some
i, v1;:::;vi is an a-path, vi;:::;vn is a u-path, and
d 2 b ¸(v;v
0).
4.2 The strong model
The strong spatio-temporal ERBAC model (or ERBAC
+
ST)
combines the features of RBAC
+
ST and ERBAC07. In
other words, we have the extended directed labeled graph
(V;E;¸;¹), where E = UA [ RH a [ RH u [ PA.
Definition 12. In ERBAC
+
ST:
² a user v 2 U may activate role v
0 2 R at point d 2 D if
and only if there exists an a-path v = v1;v2;:::;vn =
v
0, and d 2 b ¹(v;v
0);
² a role v 2 R is authorized for permission v
0 2 P at
point d 2 D if and only if there exists a u-path v =
v1;v2;:::;vn = v
0, and d 2 b ¹(v;v
0);
² a user v 2 U is authorized for permission v
0 2 P at
point d 2 D if and only if there exists a path v =
v1;v2;:::;vi;:::;vn = v
0 such that vi 2 R for some
i, v1;:::;vi is an a-path, vi;:::;vn is a u-path, and
d 2 b ¹(v;v
0).
4.3 The weak model
The weak spatio-temporal ERBAC model (or ERBAC
¡
ST)
combines the features of RBAC
¡
ST and ERBAC07. Like
ERBAC
=
ST, we have the extended directed labeled graph
(V;E;¸), where E = UA [ RH a [ RH u [ PA.
Definition 13. In ERBAC
¡
ST:
² a user v 2 U may activate role v
0 2 R at point d 2 D if
and only if there exists an a-path v = v1;v2;:::;vn =
v
0, and d 2 ¸(v) \ ¸(v
0);
² a role v 2 R is authorized for permission v
0 2 P at
point d 2 D if and only if there exists a u-path v =
v1;v2;:::;vn = v
0, and d 2 ¸(v) \ ¸(v
0);
² a user v 2 U is authorized for permission v
0 2 P at
point d 2 D if and only if there exists a path v =
v1;v2;:::;vi;:::;vn = v
0 such that vi 2 R for some
i, v1;:::;vi is an a-path, vi;:::;vn is a u-path, and
d 2 ¸(v) \ ¸(vi) \ ¸(v
0).
5. PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS IN
SPATIO-TEMPORAL RBAC
5.1 Is the use of hierarchies realistic?
The examples in Figure 1 illustrate that the presence of
a role hierarchy signi¯cantly complicates the speci¯cation
210of spatio-temporal constraints. We argued in Section 3 that
there were at least three di®erent models that could be used;
even then, it was necessary to introduce the notion of trusted
entities for certain scenarios. This suggests that there are
many possible interpretations of spatio-temporal restrictions
in the presence of a role hierarchy. Choosing the appropriate
model may well be di±cult, and encoding the desired enter-
prise security policies within such a model is also likely to be
non-trivial. In the next two sections, we consider four simple
strategies that might be used to mitigate these di±culties.
5.1.1 Flat spatio-temporal RBAC
In practical applications, it might well be preferable to
assume that the set of roles is unordered, as in core ANSI-
RBAC standard or °at RBAC96 (RBAC0). This means,
of course, that the number of user- and permission-role as-
signments will increase (because such assignments are often
implicitly generated by assignments to other roles in the
presence of a role hierarchy). However, it does mean that
°at RBAC
+
ST is su±cient for specifying all spatio-temporal
constraints.
Consider the spatio-temporal requirements for the con¯g-
uration of RBAC in Figure 1(f). We transform the RBAC96
con¯guration to °at RBAC as follows: U = fu;vg, R =
fr;r
0;r
00g and UA = f(v;r
0);(v;r);(v;r
00);(u;r);(u;r
00)g.
We only need to de¯ne ¹(u;r) = D; all other nodes and
edges are enabled for any d 2 D. It is obvious that we
can easily encode the spatio-temporal requirements for other
con¯gurations of RBAC in Figure 1 using °at RBAC
+
ST.
5.1.2 Eliminate enabling restrictions on roles
An alternative approach is to eliminate enabling restric-
tions on roles: that is, set ¸(r) = D for all r 2 R. In
other words, all roles are enabled at all points in the spatial-
temporal domain. This approach is completely contrary to
existing approaches, in which roles are usually the only en-
tities for which such enabling conditions are de¯ned. In this
approach, restrictions are imposed at the outer nodes and
edges of the RBAC graph. As such, it extends the approach
advocated in the previous section by including a role hier-
archy.
An example that is often quoted in the temporal RBAC
literature is that of a night-doctor role, which should only
be enabled during the night shift hours. We would ar-
gue that instead of imposing the enabling condition on the
night-doctor role, we should impose the condition on any
assignment of that role to a user. This does not preclude
the same user from also being assigned to the day-doctor
role (which would have a di®erent enabling condition on the
user-role assignment).
It would not be di±cult to implement this kind of ap-
proach. Let us assume that we have a night-doctor role,
which should only be activated during the night shift. Then,
whenever a user is assigned to this role, an enabling con-
dition is automatically generated for that user-role assign-
ment. (If the intersection of the user's enabling condition
and this condition is empty, then the assignment fails.)
Let us now consider the impact of setting ¸(r) = D for
all r. Then, in RBAC
=
ST, a user u may activate a role r at
point d if there is an au-path u;r1;:::;rn = r and d 2 ¸(u),
a role r is authorized for permission p at point d if there
is an au-path r = r1;:::;rn;p and d 2 ¸(p), and user u
is authorized for permission p at point d if there is an au-
path u;r1;:::;rn;p and d 2 ¸(u)\¸(p); in RBAC
+
ST, a user
u may activate a role r at point d if there is an au-path
u;r1;:::;rn = r and d 2 ¹(u;r1), a role r is authorized for
permission p at point d if there is an au-path r = r1;:::;rn;p
and d 2 ¹(rn;p), and user u is authorized for permission p
at point d if there is an au-path u;r1;:::;rn;p and d 2
¹(u;r1) \ ¹(rn;p).
5.2 Partial transitive closure
Let us now assume, however, that there is a requirement
for a role hierarchy and for having enabling conditions on the
roles. We note that checking whether a user may activate a
role or is granted a permission may be a relatively complex
operation when there are spatio-temporal constraints and a
role hierarchy. This is because there may be multiple paths
between two roles in a role hierarchy and because we need
to check whether the point at which the access request was
made belongs to each of the enabling conditions. Hence,
we suggest that in practical implementations, it might be
useful to pre-compute the transitive closure of (part of) the
RBAC96 graph.
One possibility is to construct RH
¤, the transitive closure
of RH, and assign D µ D to (r;r
0) 2 RH
¤.
5.2.1 RBAC
=
ST
In RBAC
=
ST, for example, this value would be the union
of the individual b ¸ values for each path between r and r
0.
That is, given r;r
0 2 R, let ¼(r;r
0) denote the set of paths
between r and r
0, and for p 2 ¼(r;r
0), let b ¸(p;r;r
0) denote
b ¸(r;r
0) for path p. We de¯ne b ¸
¤ : RH
¤ ! 2
D, where
b ¸
¤(r;r
0) =
[
p2¼(r;r0)
b ¸(p;r;r
0)
Suppose, for example, that r4 < r2 < r1 and r4 < r3 < r1
and that r2 and r3 are incomparable. Suppose also that
¸(ri) = Di. Then
b ¸
¤(r1;r4) = (D1 \ D2 \ D4) [ (D1 \ D3 \ D4)
= D1 \ D4 \ (D2 [ D3):
We represent the partial transitive closure of RBAC
=
ST as
a tuple (V;E
¤;¸;b ¸
¤), where E
¤ = UA [ RH
¤ [ PA, ¸ :
V ! 2
D and b ¸
¤ : RH
¤ ! 2
D. Given G
¤ = (V;E
¤;¸;b ¸
¤), a
request by u to exercise a permission p at point d is granted
if u has activated a role r1 at d and there exists (r1;rn) and
(rn;p) in E
¤ such that d 2 b ¸
¤(r1;rn) \ ¸(p).
5.2.2 RBAC
+
ST
Similarly, in RBAC
+
ST, for p 2 ¼(r;r
0), let b ¹(p;r;r
0) de-
note b ¹(r;r
0) for path p. We de¯ne b ¹
¤ : RH
¤ ! 2
D, where
b ¹
¤(r;r
0) =
[
p2¼(r;r0)
b ¹(p;r;r
0)
We represent the partial transitive closure of RBAC
+
ST
as a tuple (V;E
¤;¸;¹; b ¹
¤). Given G
¤ = (V;E
¤;¸;¹; b ¹
¤), a
request by u to exercise a permission p at point d is granted
if u has activated a role r1 at d and there exists (r1;rn) and
(rn;p) in E
¤ such that d 2 b ¹
¤(r1;rn) \ ¹(rn;p).
5.2.3 Spatio-temporal ERBAC07
For the models based on ERBAC07, we compute RH
¤
a, the
transitive closure of RH a, and RH
¤
u, the transitive closure
211of RH u, and de¯ne functions b ¸
¤
a, b ¸
¤
u, b ¹
¤
a and b ¹
¤
u. We omit
further details.
5.3 Full transitive closure
We now brie°y consider the full transitive closure of G,
G
? = (V;E
?), where E
? = (UA [ RH [ PA)
¤. In RBAC
=
ST,
given v;v
0 2 V , let ¼(v;v
0) denote the set of paths between
v and v
0, and for p 2 ¼(v;v
0), let b ¸(p;v;v
0) denote b ¸(v;v
0)
for path p. We de¯ne b ¸
? : E
? ! 2
D, where
b ¸
?(v;v
0) =
[
p2¼(v;v0)
b ¸(p;v;v
0)
We represent the full transitive closure of RBAC
=
ST as a
tuple (V;E
?;¸;b ¸
?). Given G
? = (V;E
?;¸;b ¸
?), a request by
u to exercise permission p at point d is granted if there exists
(u;p) in E
? such that d 2 b ¸
?(u;p).
The full transitive closure of RBAC
+
ST, ERBAC
=
ST and
ERBAC
+
ST are similar, and are omitted. Computing the
full transitive closure will only be practical for relatively
small numbers of users and permissions, so it is likely that
computing the partial transitive closure will be more useful
in practice.
5.4 Concluding remarks
We have developed three spatio-temporal RBAC models
and introduced the notion of trusted entities to specify the
spatio-temporal requirements in di®erent con¯gurations of
RBAC. The need for di®erent models arises because once
enabling conditions are imposed on roles, there are a num-
ber of di®erent choices for the semantics of authorization. In
practice, it is complicated and error-prone to specify compre-
hensive spatio-temporal requirements in hierarchical RBAC
model. Therefore, we would argue that, in many practi-
cal situations, the most appropriate approach is to use °at
RBAC
+
ST to specify spatio-temporal requirements.
However, when there are very large numbers of user
and permissions, it may well be appropriate to use role
hierarchies, thereby avoiding large numbers of user- and
permission-role assignments. In this case, it is appropriate
to set ¸(r) = D for all r 2 R, and specify enabling condi-
tions on restrictions on outer nodes and edges, such as users
and user-role assignments, of the RBAC graph. We should
perhaps note that the underlying \philosophy" of RBAC is
to use roles to reduce the burden of administration, and that
our suggestion of applying enabling constraints to users and
user-role assignment is inconsistent with this basic tenet.
As we have seen, however, many situations may require con-
straints on users and user-role assignment, rather than roles.
This suggests that incorporating spatio-temporal constraints
within RBAC is likely to require some trade-o® between the
complexity of policies that can be supported and the com-
plexity of constraint speci¯cation and administration.
In addition, when there are requirements for role hierar-
chy and enabling conditions on the roles, we suggest that it
is appropriate to pre-compute the transitive closure of the
role hierarchy to avoid complex computations when checking
access requests. On the other hand, it is unlikely that it is
useful to pre-compute the full transitive closure of RBAC96
graph in many practical systems, because the size of E
? will
be very large. However, deciding access requests can be per-
formed far more quickly than in the other three approaches.
6. SPATIO-TEMPORAL DOMAINS
Much of the work in extending RBAC to include spatial
and temporal restrictions on entities and entity relationships
has spent a considerable amount of time on how these re-
strictions might be speci¯ed. The authors of GTRBAC,
for example, de¯ne a syntax for temporal restrictions us-
ing the notion of calendars [9]. Although we believe that it
is of much greater importance to understand the interaction
between RBAC inheritance and such restrictions, we now
brie°y consider how sets of points within a spatio-temporal
domain might be speci¯ed.
Broadly speaking, there are two possibilities: concrete and
symbolic domains. A concrete domain makes use of actual
points in space-time, whereas a symbolic domain uses labels
as synonyms for sets of points in an associated concrete do-
main. We consider spatial and temporal domains separately.
A single spatio-temporal domain D can be treated as a pair
(S;T ), where S is a spatial domain and T is a temporal
domain.
6.1 Representing location
A concrete spatial domain is de¯ned by a co-ordinate sys-
tem: we could use standard Euclidean space or we may
use spherical or cylindrical co-ordinate systems, for exam-
ple. The system chosen will be entirely dependent on the
method by which user location is determined. For ease of
exposition, we will de¯ne the concrete spatial domain to be
S = f(x;y) : x;y 2 Zg. In other words, points in space are
de¯ned by two integer co-ordinates.
An atomic location is de¯ned to be a rectangle, which
is de¯ned by the co-ordinates of its lower-left and upper-
right corners.
6 That is, a rectangle is a pair [l;r], where
l;r 2 S. A location is the union of one or more disjoint
atomic locations: clearly, the set of locations is a subset of
2
S and ¸ maps an entity to a location.
Having de¯ned a concrete spatial domain, we may de¯ne
a symbolic spatial domain, in which locations are associated
with labels. Symbolic locations may be de¯ned to be the
union of other symbolic locations; these symbolic locations
may overlap. Having de¯ned a set of symbolic locations, we
must de¯ne a mapping from the set of symbolic locations to
concrete locations. We may also use ¸ to map entities to
symbolic locations, and then map the symbolic location to
a concrete location.
Let s 2 S be a point in the concrete spatial domain, and
let L µ S be a concrete location. We write s 2 L if s belongs
to one of the atomic locations contained in L. If L is a
union of symbolic locations, we write s 2 L to denote that s
belongs to at least one of the symbolic locations contained
in L.
6.2 Representing time
We assume the existence of a clock, whose ticks are in-
dexed by the natural numbers N.
7 An atomic interval in
6Of course, we could de¯ne a location to be a circular region
in the concrete spatial domain, by de¯ning the center c 2 S
and radius r 2 Z of the circle. Again, the de¯nition of
location will be determined by the method used to identify
the position of a user.
7It should be noted that representing time will be more com-
plex than this for many applications; typically a local time is
relative to a location and a time of year. Our representation
of time, as for location, is merely illustrative.
212the concrete temporal domain T = N, is de¯ned by a start
point t1 2 T and an end point t2 2 T , and written as [t1;t2].
An interval is de¯ned to be the union of one or more disjoint
atomic intervals; ¸ maps an entity to an interval.
We may also de¯ne a symbolic temporal domain, in which
intervals are associated with labels. We could, for exam-
ple, de¯ne the symbolic intervals 21:August:2007, Mon-
days:2007, WorkingHours etc. We may use ¸ to map entities
to symbolic intervals.
Let t 2 T be a point in the concrete temporal domain,
and let I µ T be a concrete interval. We write t 2 I if t
belongs to one of the atomic intervals contained in I. If I is
the union of symbolic intervals, we write t 2 I to denote that
t belongs to at least one of the symbolic intervals contained
in I.
6.3 Example
In this section we present examples to illustrate the appli-
cations of spatial RBAC
=
ST, temporal RBAC
=
ST and spatio-
temporal ERBAC
+
ST in practical environment.
6.3.1 Spatial RBAC
=
ST
Figure 2 illustrates some of the ideas that we have intro-
duced in this paper. Figure 2(a) lists a number of RBAC
entities associated with a computer science department at a
university. Figure 2(b) illustrates the relationships between
these entities. A user u2, who is assigned to role r1, is al-
lowed to activate roles r2;r3;r4 in any session. In RBAC96,
u2 is authorized to invoke permissions p1;p2;p3;p4 since any
permission can be reached by u2 via a path in the graph.
In order to de¯ne spatial constraints for this example, we
describe the layout of a °oor in the computer building, as
shown in Figure 2(c). Figure 2(d) de¯nes enabling con-
straints for the RBAC entities in Figure 2(a). Note that
all roles are enabled everywhere within the computer build-
ing, as suggested in Section 5.1.2. For example, permission
to access the ACM and IEEE libraries (p2) is only allowed
if the requester is in the seminar room (SR), Alice's o±ce
(AO), or Bob's o±ce (BO). In Diane's o±ce, for example,
permissions p2 and p3 are not enabled; however, Diane is
allowed to activate r3 (Admin sta®), thereby enabling her
to view sta® pro¯le.
6.3.2 Temporal RBAC
=
ST
Let us consider the graphical formulation of RBAC96 poli-
cies for the computer building shown in Figure 2(a) and 2(b).
Let us assume that Figure 2(d) represents symbolic temporal
domains for all entities of RBAC96 in the example of com-
puter building. Then at a particular point of time 14:00, the
permission p3 is not enabled. All other entities are enabled,
and related edges exist at time 14:00. For example, Alice is
allowed to activate role r2 to use the permission p1 that is
inherited from role r4 at time instant 14:00.
6.3.3 Spatio-temporal ERBAC
+
ST
Consider the activation and usage hierarchies of ER-
BAC07 shown in Figures 3(a) and 3(b), respectively, and
the user-role assignment and the permission-role assignment
are as same as the con¯gurations in Figure 2(b). For ex-
ample, user u2 is authorized to activate role r1, but is not
thereby authorized for permission p4 which is not inherited
by r1 in the permission usage hierarchy. Let us assume that
Figure 2(a) represents ERBAC07 policies in the computer
building.
Figures 2(d) and 3(c) represent the spatio-temporal en-
abling conditions for RBAC entities and relations. Note
that a user must explicitly activate the Admin sta® role
in order to use the permissions associated with this role.
Note also that the speci¯cation of spatio-temporal domains
on edges observes the consistency constraint between nodes
and edges. At a particular spatio-temporal point (Alice's of-
¯ce, 13:30), Alice can not activate the role (Academic sta®),
because Alice is not assigned academic sta® role at point
(AO,13:30) although both user (Alice) and role (Academic
sta®) are enabled at point (AO,13:30). On the other hand,
at point (Diane's o±ce, 14:00), Bob can activate the role
(Admin sta®) to use the permission (View sta® pro¯le).
7. RELATED WORK
In this section we examine the GTRBAC model [9] and the
spatio-temporal RBAC model of Ray and Toahchoodee [12]
in more detail, and review other related work on context-
based access control. We explain why we believe that our
model is more attractive than related work according to
several criteria: well-de¯ned authorization semantics, syn-
tactic completeness (constraints on all RBAC entities and
relations), consistency (absence of con°icts, resolution of
con°icts), and syntactic simplicity (number of predicates or
functions).
7.1 GTRBAC
The temporal-RBAC model (TRBAC) introduces tempo-
ral constraints which limit the time during which a role is
enabled and activated [3]. Generalized TRBAC (GTRBAC)
is an extension of TRBAC that applies temporal constraints
to the assignment of users and permissions to roles [9].
GTRBAC does not consider temporal constraints on users
(sessions), permissions and role hierarchical relationships.
Moreover, GTRBAC, unlike our models, does not impose
any consistency constraints on the user- and permission-role
assignments and role-role relationships.
GTRBAC de¯nes a \hybrid" role hierarchy that con-
tains three di®erent types of role hierarchy relationships:
role-activation hierarchy 6a, permission-usage hierarchy
6u and permission-activation hierarchy 6. However, the
permission-activation hierarchy is redundant and can be de-
¯ned in terms of other two hierarchies, that is x 6 y if and
only if x 6a y and x 6u y. GTRBAC further sub-divide hi-
erarchies into\weakly"and\strongly"restricted; the autho-
rization semantics for these hierarchies di®er. The weakly
restricted semantics for permission usage [9, Table 7], are
de¯ned by
can be acquired(p;x;t) Ã8p; (x >u y)^
enabled(x;t)^
can be acquired(p;y;t): (1)
The intuition seems to be that if x is enabled, x >u y and
y can acquire permission p, then x can acquire permission
p. To quote Joshi et al: \The weakly restricted hierarchies
allow inheritance or activation semantics in the nonoverlap-
ping intervals...only role x needs to be enabled at time t
for the [usage] inheritance semantics to apply".
However, there are a number of problems with this def-
inition. The predicate can_be_acquired is de¯ned recur-
sively, but there is no base case; in particular, replacing x
213u1 Alice
u2 Bob
u3 Chris
u4 Diane
r1 Head of department
r2 Academic sta®
r3 Admin sta®
r4 Student
p1 Access resources via Metalib
p2 Access ACM and IEEE library
p3 Listen to presentations
p4 View sta® pro¯le
(a) RBAC entities
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(b) Graphical representation of RBAC relations
Seminar Room
(SR)
Alice's Office
(AO)
Bob's Office
(BO)
Lobby
(LO)
Undergraduate Lab
(UL)
Postgraduate Lab
(PL)
PhD Room
(PR)
Diane's Office
(DO)
0
10
20 40 60 80
20
30
(c) Spatial domain
Spatial domain Temporal domain
Entity Symbolic Concrete Symbolic
u1 CB [(0,0),(80,30)] 09:00-17:59
u2 CB [(0,0),(80,30)] 09:00-17:59
u3 CB [(0,0),(80,30)] Always
u4 CB [(0,0),(80,30)] Always
r1 CB [(0,0),(80,30)] Always
r2 CB [(0,0),(80,30)] Always
r3 CB [(0,0),(80,30)] Always
r4 CB [(0,0),(80,30)] Always
p1 CB [(0,0),(80,30)] Always
p2 SR [ AO [ BO [(10,20),(30,30)] [ [(45,20),(80,30)] 09:00-17:59
p3 SR [(10,20),(30,30)] 12:00-13:00
p4 DO [(30,20),(45,30)] Always
(d) Spatial-temporal enabling conditions
Figure 2: Spatio-temporal RBAC example
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(b) 6u
¹((u1;r2)) (CB, 09:00¡13:00 [ 14:00¡17:59)
¹((u2;r1)) (CB, 09:00¡13:00 [ 14:00¡17:59)
¹((u3;r4)) (CB, Always)
¹((u4;r3)) (CB, Always)
¹((r1;r2)) (CB, Always)
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¹((r2;r4)) (CB, Always)
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¹((r4;p1)) (CB, Always)
¹((r2;p2)) (SR [ AO [ BO, 09:00¡13:00 [ 14:00¡17:59)
¹((r4;r3)) (SR, 12:00¡13:00)
¹((r3;p4)) (DO, Always)
(c) Spatio-temporal domains
Figure 3: A graphical formulation of ERBAC
+
ST policies in the computing building
with y (which is legitimate, since y > y) in the rule above
means we have a circular de¯nition. Presumably the base
case is that (p;y) 2 PA, but the presence of the parameter
t in can_be_acquired suggests that there may be an en-
abling condition on this assignment. Similar problems exist
for weakly restricted semantics for role activation, and for
strongly restricted semantics for permission acquisition and
role activation.
Without a base case, it is impossible to determine the
intended meaning of weakly and strongly restricted hierar-
chies. Moreover, it seems that any enabling conditions on
roles between x and y are ignored. This makes a direct com-
parison between our models and GTRBAC impossible. The
strongly restricted semantics require x and y to be enabled,
which suggests that strongly restricted semantics in GTR-
BAC are (intended to be) somewhat similar to RBAC
¡
ST.
7.2 Spatio-temporal RBAC
Ray and Toahchoodee developed a spatio-temporal RBAC
model [12] that is strongly in°uenced by GTRBAC. Indeed,
the main novelty of their approach is to introduce spatial and
temporal constraints on all the components of RBAC. They
also consider the consistency of the constraints on user-role
and permission-role assignments.
Like ERBAC07, they introduce a role activation hierar-
chy 6a and a permission usage hierarchy 6u. They also
de¯ne temporal constraints, location constraints, and tem-
poral and location constraints on these two role hierarchies.
Let us consider the representative example of\time location
restricted permission inheritance hierarchy" [12, De¯nition
13], where
PermRoleAcquire(p;x;d;l) Ã 8p;(x >u y)^
PermRoleAcquire(p;y;d;l): (2)
Here, d represents a set of time points and l a set of points
in space. Again, it is not clear what the base case is, and
intermediate roles between x and y are ignored.
In addition, this de¯nition may give rise to con-
°icts within the speci¯cation of enabling conditions. If
PermRoleAcquire(p;r;d;l) holds then r and p are enabled
at all points within d and l [12, Section 4.5]. Now let us
assume that
² RoleEnableLoc(x) = l
0 (x is enabled at l
0) and
RoleEableDur(x) = d
0 (x is enabled during d
0),
² PermRoleAcquire(p;y;d;l) holds and x >u y,
² d
0 ½ d and l
0 ½ l.
Then we have PermRoleAcquire(p;x;d;l), by (2). This im-
plies that x is enabled at l ¾ l
0 and d ¾ d
0, which contradicts
the enabling conditions de¯ned on x. Similar con°icts ex-
ist for weakly temporal and location restricted permission
acquisition.
7.3 Summary of other work
Work has been done on spatial constraints in the context
of mandatory access control (MAC) [11], discretionary ac-
cess control (DAC) [2] and RBAC models [4, 8]. This work
has either studied spatial constraints in traditional access
control models [2, 11], rather than RBAC, or proposed a
limited spatially constrained RBAC [8]. GEO-RBAC [4] in-
troduces a comprehensive spatial RBAC model for specify-
ing spatial constraints on roles and treat locations as objects
in RBAC model. They also introduce GEO-HRBAC model
that de¯nes the role hierarchy based on the containment
of locations. Compared with our models, we believe that
GEO-HRBAC is too application-dependent, and focuses on
controlling access on di®erent locations.
There has also been research on more general context in-
formation to achieve ¯ned-grained role-based access control.
TeaM-based access control (TMAC) [7, 16] approach ex-
tends RBAC with the notion of team and context-based per-
mission activation. Covington et al [6] introduce the concept
of environment roles in RBAC which are activated based on
the values of environmental conditions. Strembeck et al [15]
introduce the concept of context constraints in RBAC which
is used to restrict usage of permissions through considering
environmental factors in access control decision. Although
all above works attempted to incorporate general contextual
information in RBAC model, none of them has comprehen-
sively studied the impacts of context on all the components
of RBAC model.
215We conclude that despite the considerable amount of
research on spatio-temporal RBAC models, existing work
su®ers from signi¯cant shortcomings. These include
poorly de¯ned authorization semantics, syntax that is both
complicated and inadequate, lack of compatibility with
RBAC96/ANSI-RBAC standard and a lack of consistency.
The GTRBAC model and that of Ray and Toahchoodee {
perhaps the two most detailed models in the literature { suf-
fer from all of these problems. We have already noted some
of these problems in earlier sections. Comparing the syn-
tactic complexity, Joshi et al de¯ne 23 predicates in GTR-
BAC, Ray and Toahchoodee de¯ne 16, whereas we supple-
ment RBAC96 with two functions ¸ and ¹. Perhaps the
biggest di®erence between our approach and existing work
is to focus on semantics, rather than syntax; we believe the
former to be much the harder and less well understood of
the two aspects of a spatio-temporal RBAC model.
8. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we constructed a number of spatio-temporal
role-based models based on RBAC96 and ERBAC07 using
a simple extension of the syntax used for RBAC96 and the
ANSI-RBAC standard. We introduced a graph-based for-
malism to explain the semantics of RBAC96, and used this
as a basis for de¯ning the semantics of our spatio-temporal
models. We note, in passing, that these semantics might be
a useful addition to the ANSI-RBAC standard.
We examined the di±culties that arise when enabling con-
straints are placed on roles in the presence of role hierar-
chy. We proposed the use of °at RBAC
+
ST to encode spatio-
temporal constraints. When it is necessary to use the role hi-
erarchy, perhaps the most important conclusion of our work
is that it is rarely helpful to impose such enabling constraints
on roles; instead, these constraints should be applied to users
and user-role assignments. We can realize this approach by
using RBAC
+
ST and specifying that ¸(r) = D for all roles
r. We also demonstrated that some pre-computation of en-
abling conditions on the transitive closure of (part of) RBAC
graph can be performed to simplify the evaluation of access
requests in the case that enabling conditions are placed on
roles.
There are two interesting directions for future work. A
¯rst priority is to investigate spatio-temporal separation of
duty. We would like to formally classify various spatio-
temporal separation of duty constraints, and propose e±-
cient mechanisms for enforcing those constraints.
We also intend to extend the model to any partially or-
dered set of entity attributes, not just space and time. For
example, imagine that there are several security domains
within an organization and that each domain is associated
with a security clearance. Then some entities/assignments
are only enabled when the user belongs to an appropriate
domain.
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